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I. INTRODUCTION
"Victim impact" evidence is that evidence in a criminal matter
relating to the victim's personal characteristics and the emotional impact
of the crime on the victim's family.' A recent United States Supreme
Court decision, Payne v. Tennessee,2 involved the admissibility of "victim
impact" evidence at a capital sentencing hearing.
This note will first discuss the facts of Payne and the lower courts'
holdings and will then briefly review the prior jurisprudence involving
victim impact evidence in capital cases. Next is an analysis of the case,
followed by this writer's recommendations, both general and specific to
Louisiana, in light of.this recent Supreme Court decision. Finally, this
casenote will conclude with a summary of the use of victim impact
evidence in capital cases.
The court held correctly that the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution3 does not erect a per se bar to the admission of
victim impact evidence in a capital sentencing hearing.' In doing so
though, the court seemingly encouraged the use of such evidence. This
holding could lead to troubling results if the states take advantage of
the free reign given to them by the Court in Payne to admit victim
impact evidence at a capital sentencing hearing. This note will discuss
some of the evils of admitting this type of evidence and propose that
states, particularly Louisiana, keep this type of evidence out of the
sentencing phase of a capital trial where the accused faces the possibility
of being sentenced to death.
II. PAYNE V. TENNESSEE
Payne involved the brutal murder of a twenty eight year-old woman,
Charisse Christopher, and her two year-old daughter Lacie. Charisse's three
year-old son Nicholas was also a victim of this crime, yet miraculously sur-
vived the attack. The three victims lived across the hall from the defendant's
Copyright 1992, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Payne v. Tennessee, III S. Ct. 2597, 2604 (1991).
2. Id.
3. U.S. Const. amend. VIl: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
4. Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2609.
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girlfriend in a building which housed four apartments. At the time of
the offenses, Payne had been awaiting the return of his girlfriend from
a trip to Arkansas. Upon her continued absence, and after considerable
drinking and injecting of cocaine, Payne entered the victims' apartment
and made sexual advances toward Charisse Christopher. After she refused
Payne's advances, an angered and intoxicated Payne brutally attacked
the three victims with a butcher knife. 5
A neighbor who resided in the apartment directly below the Chris-
tophers' apartment heard Charisse screaming "[g]et out, get out," as
if she was urging her children to leave the apartment. 6 The neighbor
then called the police. When the first officer arrived at the scene, he
encountered Payne leaving the building drenched in blood. Payne claimed
to be the complaintant. When the officer asked Payne what was going
on, Payne struck the officer with the overnight bag he was carrying
and ran. He was apprehended later that day.'
Charisse and Lacie Christopher were dead when the police entered
the apartment. Charisse had sustained 41 thrusts of a butcher knife,
which in aggregate caused her to bleed to death. Similarly, Lacie died
of numerous knife wounds. Nicholas was still alive despite several wounds
inflicted by the knife that completely penetrated his body. He survived
the assault after undergoing seven hours of surgery and receiving more
blood than his estimated normal blood volume. Throughout the trial
Payne insisted that he had not harmed any of the Christophers but
rather had tried to help them and in doing so became covered with
blood .8
At trial, Payne was found guilty of two counts of first degree
murder and one count of first degree assault with the intent to commit
murder in the first degree. The controversy in this case centered around
the admission of testimony of Charisse's mother at the defendant's
sentencing hearing following the guilty verdicts. Her testimony concerned
the effect of the murders on Nicholas. Charisse's mother stated:
He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why she
doesn't come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes
to me many times during the week and asks me, Grandmama,
do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I'm worried
about my Lacie.9
5. Id. at 2601-02.
6. Id. at 2601.
7. Id. at 2601-02.
8. Id. at 2602.
9. Id. at 2603.
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Additionally, when arguing for the death penalty during the closing
argument, the prosecutor spoke of the continuing effect of the murders
on Nicholas.'0
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding that
the testimony in question, "[wihile technically irrelevant, . . . did not
create a constitutionally unacceptable risk of an arbitrary imposition of
the death penalty, and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."" The
court additionally found that "the prosecutor's argument [was] relevant
to this defendant's personal responsibility and moral guilt.'", The court
went on to say, "assuming the [prosecutor's] argument here violated
the Eighth Amendment, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court, we think it subject to harmless error analysis."' 3 Undoubtedly
and understandably, the court was influenced by the egregiousness of
this particular case when it applied the harmless error analysis. However,
the court should have based the sentencing decision on the heinousness
of the offense alone, rather than allowing the jury to consider the
irrelevant evidence concerning the unintended consequences of Payne's
actions on the victims' family.
III. PRIOR JURISPRUDENCE
Until Payne, this type of evidence, termed "victim impact" evidence,
was previously held to be inadmissable at the sentencing phasi of a
capital trial under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. 4 The
Supreme Court first addressed this issue in Booth v. Maryland."' In this
case, a Maryland statute provided for victim impact statements which
described the personal characteristics of the victims and the emotional
impact of the crimes on the family to be prepared in capital cases. The
statement also included the opinions and characterizations of both the
crimes and the defendant expressed by the victims' family members.
The victims in Booth were an elderly couple who were killed by the
defendants during an attempt to rob the couple in their home. The
couple had children and grandchildren who provided the information
for the victim impact statement. "Many of their comments emphasized
the victims' outstanding personal qualities, and noted how deeply the
Bronsteins would be missed."' 6
10. Id.
It. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 18 (Tenn. 1990).
12. Id. at 19 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3378
(1982)).
13. Id. at 19.
14. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987) and South Carolina
v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989).
15. Booth, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S. Ct. 2529.
16. Id. at 499, 107 S. Ct. at 2531.
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The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's death sentence imposed
by the Maryland court, finding that the admission of victim impact
evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital trial created a constitu-
tionally unacceptable risk that the jury may have imposed the death
penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner. This is because in a
capital case, the sentencing decision must focus on the defendant as a
"uniquely individual human being,"' 7 and, the Court reasoned, "[tihe
focus of a VIS [victim impact statement], however, is not on the de-
fendant, but on the character and reputation of the victim and the
effect on his family." This creates a problem because "[tlhese factors
may be wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defen-
dant." 8
The Supreme Court revisited the issue in South Carolina v. Gathers.,9
In Gathers the defendant was convicted of murder and criminal sexual
conduct and sentenced to death. Here the prosecutor read to the sen-
tencing jury at length from the religious tract that the victim was carrying
at the time of the crime and commented on the personal qualities that
he inferred from the victim's possession of such tract and a voter
registration card. The Supreme Court affirmed the South Carolina court's
decision which had held that the prosecutor's comments "conveyed the
suggestion appellant deserved a death sentence because the victim was
a religious man and a registered voter." 20 The Court reasoned that in
capital cases, the defendant's punishment "must be tailored to his per-
sonal responsibility and moral guilt." 2' The Court noted that it had left
open the possibility that the kind of information contained in victim
impact statements could be admissible if it "relate[d] directly to the
circumstances of the crime."22 It concluded, however, that this exception
was not met here and that the prosecutor's comments were not directly
related to the circumstances of the crime merely because the tract and
the voter registration card were strewn around the victim's body.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
A. The Majority Opinion
In Payne, the Court overruled this prior jurisprudence by deciding
the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar to victim impact evidence.23
17. Id. at 504, 107 S. Ct. at 2534 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 304, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2990 (1976)).
18. Id. at 504, 107 S. Ct. at 2534.
19. 490 U.S. 805, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989).
20. State v. Gathers, 295 S.C. 476, 484, 369 S.E.2d 140, 144 (1988).
21. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S 782, 801, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3378 (1982).
22. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507 n.10, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2535 n.10 (1987).
23. Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991).
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The Court reasoned: "Victim impact evidence is simply another form
or method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm
caused by the crime in question, evidence of a general type long con-
sidered by sentencing authorities. ' ' The majority went on to state that
"there is nothing unfair about allowing the jury to bear in mind that
harm at the same time as it considers the mitigating evidence introduced
by the defendant.''2 Here Payne had produced four witnesses to testify
on his behalf who stated that the offenses in question were generally
inconsistent with Payne's character. 6 The majority thus concluded that
Tennessee could properly admit the testimony of Charisse Christopher's
mother given at the defendant's sentencing hearing and affirmed the
death sentence.27 In other words, the Court felt that since the defendant
had introduced evidence as to his good character, the prosecution could
similarly introduce evidence as to the good character of the victims.
The Court also discussed the doctrine of stare decisis, but concluded
that when past decisions, like Booth and Gathers, are unworkable or
badly reasoned, the Court does not feel constrained by the precedent.28
The precise holding of the Court, i.e., "if the State chooses to
permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial ar-
gument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar,"2 9
appears to be fundamentally correct. In Harmelin v. Michigan,0 handed
down the same day as Payne, a plurality of the Court held that the
Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee between crime
and punishment. In its discussion, the Harmelin Court examined the
history of the Eighth Amendment and found that the clause was meant
to disable the "[liegislature from authorizing particular forms or 'modes'
of punishment-specifically, cruel methods of punishment that are not
regularly or customarily employed." 3' Additionally, the Court found that
"the fact that what was 'cruel and unusual' under the Eighth Amendment
was to be determined without reference to the particular offense is
confirmed by all available evidence of contemporary understanding. '32
It thus follows that the Eighth Amendment is not an evidentiary rule,"
24. Id. at 2608.
25. Id. at 2609.
26. Id. at 2602.
27. Id. at 2611.
28. Id. at 2609 (citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665, 64 S. Ct. 757, 765
(1944)).
29. Payne v. Tennessee, III S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991).
30. 1i1 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
31. Id. at 2691.
32. Id. at 2693.
33. It has been decided that capital punishment is not inherently cruel or inhumane.
The purpose of the Eighth Amendment is to prevent the imposition of inhumane, unusual
19921 1303
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and was not designed to address the issue of admissibility of evidence.
Therefore, as the Court found in Payne, the Eighth Amendment does
not mandate the exclusion of victim impact evidence.
While the Eighth Amendment may not provide a basis for exclusion,
as this article will explore, there are many other valid reasons why this
type of evidence should be excluded at the sentencing phase of a capital
trial. The potential for the imposition of the death penalty in an arbitrary
and capricious manner is too great.Y When it stated "[tihere is no
reason to treat such evidence differently than other relevant evidence is
treated," the Court erred."
B. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
In the words of Justice O'Connor, "[w]e do not hold today that
victim impact evidence must be admitted, or even that it should be
admitted." 36 She went on to state that "[ijf, in a particular case, a
witness' testimony or a prosecutor's remark so infects the sentencing
proceeding as to render it fundamentally unfair, the defendant may seek
appropriate relief under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."'" This writer submits this is not enough protection for a
capital defendant. By its very nature victim impact evidence is unduly
inflammatory. Sentencing is a crucial stage in the capital proceeding for
a defendant. His life is at stake and the jury's emotions are preyed
upon by grieving family members of the victim. Therefore, the jury is
more likely to impose the death sentence on an emotional whim rather
than because of this defendant's moral responsibility based on the cir-
cumstances of the crime. Additionally, this argument' is flawed in that
Justice O'Connor assumes such evidence is relevant and has some bearing
on the defendant's personal responsibility and moral guilt which it does
not.
C. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia begins his opinion by stating: "The Court correctly
observes the injustice of requiring the exclusion of relevant aggravating
punishments such as maiming, mutilating, and other methods of torture, etc. It is not a
vehicle to prohibit evidence at a hearing to determine whether or not to impose a penalty
which does not violate the cruel and unusual clause.
34. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932 (1976) (joint opinion
of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.J., stating that the jury's discretion to impose the
death sentence must be "suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary and capricious action.").
35. Payne v. Tennessee, III S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991).




evidence during capital sentencing, while requiring the admission of all
relevant mitigating evidence."138
Scalia's statement is based on the faulty premise that the defendant
and the state are on equal footing. The entire framework of the criminal
justice system is set up purposely to be biased in favor of the defendant.
This is evidenced by the state's burden of proof in a criminal case-
beyond a reasonable doubt. This is because in the criminal system every
accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond this heightened
standard. Therefore, the accused is entitled to the benefit of every doubt
and likewise the benefit of admission of all mitigating evidence without
a like privilege being given to the state.
D. Justice Souter's Concurrence
Similar to the reasoning of Justice Scalia, Justice Souter stated that
"sentencing without such evidence of victim impact may be seen as a
significantly imbalanced process." 3 9 Again, this is unsupported by the
way our criminal justice system treats a defendant. The state is not and
should not be on equal footing with a criminal defendant.
E. Justice Marshall's Dissent
Justice Marshall's chief criticism of the majority's decision is its
ready departure from precedent. He stated: "Neither the law nor the
facts supporting Booth and Gathers underwent any change in the last
four years. Only the personnel of this Court did." 4 Justice Marshall
felt that the Court lacked "special justification" 41 for departing from
precedent".4 He went on to explain the possible justifications, including
"the advent of 'subsequent changes or development in the law' that
undermine a decision's rationale, the need 'to bring (a decision] into
agreement with experience and with facts newly ascertained' and a
showing that a particular precedent has become a 'detriment to coherence
and consistency in the law."' 43 From this Justice Marshall then concluded
the majority in Payne lacked justification for overruling prior jurispru-
dence. 4
38. Id. at 2613.
39. Id. at 2616.
40. Id. at 2619.
41. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 2310-11 (1984).
42. Payne v. Tennessee, III S. Ct. 2597, 2621-22 (1991).
43. Id. at 2621-22 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173, 109
S. Ct. 2363, 2370-71 (1989); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412, 52
S. Ct. 443, 450 (1932)).
44. Id. at 2621-22.
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F. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens responded to the majority's conclusion that fairness
requires victim impact evidence be admissible to counteract the mitigating
evidence which the defendant is entitled to introduce by pointing out
flaws in the majority's reasoning.'5 Justice Stevens pointed out that this
reasoning is based on the incorrect proposition that a criminal prose-
cution requires an even-handed balance between the state and the de-
fendant. 6 Significantly, he noted, the criminal system is designed to
protect the criminal defendant, as is illustrated by the heavier burden
of proof and rules of evidence.47 This follows from the disproportionate
and significantly flawed resources available to a criminal defendant whose
liberty is at stake as compared to the powerful state.
Alternatively Justice Stevens noted that "[just as the defendant is
entitled to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence, so the State may
rebut that evidence and may designate any relevant conduct to be an
aggravating factor provided that the factor is sufficiently well defined
and consistently applied to cabin the sentencer's discretion."4'
In his dissenting opinion Justice Stevens also pointed out the evils
of comparative judgments by use of a hypothetical situation. "Thus, if
a defendant, who had murdered a convenience store clerk in cold blood
in the course of an armed robbery, offered evidence unknown to him
at the time of the crime about the immoral character of his victim, all
would recognize immediately that the evidence was irrelevant and in-
admissible."'19
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
In deciding this case, the Court stated that the Eighth Amendment
erects no barrier to the admission of victim impact evidence. But, by
unnecessarily discussing at length why such evidence is relevant to the
sentencing inquiry, the Court effectively condones the states' admission
of such evidence in capital proceedings. The majority in Payne found
such evidence relevant by drawing an analogy between the admission of
victim impact evidence to sway the jury in favor of imposing the death
penalty and the differing punishments for murder and attempted mur-
der.10 The rationale is that punishments can be different because of the
differing amounts of harm inflicted. The majority compared attempted
45. Id. at 2608.
46. Id. at 2627.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2627.
49. Id. at 2626.
50. Id. at 2605.
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murder and murder with the death of a victim with no family and the
death of a victim who leaves grieving loved ones behind. This analogy
is inaccurate, because in the case of attempted murder the intended
consequence is death and therefore that death (if in fact the defendant
is successful in his attempt) can logically serve to increase the penalty.
In the case of victim impact evidence, the defendant may not have even
been aware of a victim's family. He therefore has no way of intending
the consequence of injury to them, which is a necessary prerequisite to
being considered part of a defendant's personal responsibility and moral
guilt.
There are many valid policy reasons for the exclusion of victim
impact evidence, and the Supreme Court would have done well to point
them out in Payne. It is illogical to hold a defendant responsible for
factors. that "may be wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a
particular defendant." 5' As pointed out in People v. Levitt, 2 and referred
to in Booth, "[s]uch bereavement is relevant to damages in a civil
action, but it has no relationship to the proper purposes of sentencing
in a criminal case." 3 This is a logical distinction because in a civil trial
monetary compensation is the goal, whereas in a capital criminal trial,
a person is being punished, and that punishment could be the death
penalty.
In addition to the policy reasons supporting inadmissibility, another
factor the Court ignored is its holding that in a capital trial, the jury
must make an "individualized determination" of whether the defendant
should be executed based on "character of the individual and the cir..
cumstances of the crime.' ' 4 This holding was also cited in Booth" to
support the proposition that while the Court has never said that the
defendant's record, characteristics, and the circumstances of the crime
are the only permissible sentencing considerations, a state statute that
requires consideration of other factors must be scrutinized to ensure
that the evidence has some bearing on the defendant's "personal re-
sponsibility and moral guilt."' 6 This writer submits that victim impact
evidence is irrelevant to a defendant's personal responsibility and moral
guilt. The admission of such evidence will only serve to increase the
number of death sentences based on arbitrary criteria. The Court stated
in Booth that "[ilt is well-settled that a jury's discretion to impose the
death sentence must be 'suitably directed and limited so as to minimize
51. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2534 (1987).
52. 156 Cal. App. 3d 500, 516-17, 203 Cal. Rptr. 276, 287-88 (1984).
53. 482 U.S. 496, 505 n.7, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2534 n.7 (1987).
54. Zant v. Stephens. 462 U.S. 862, 879, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2743 (1983).
55. 482 U.S. at 502, 107 S. Ct. at 2532.
56. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3378 (1982).
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the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."' As the dissenters
in Payne relate, "The victim is not on trial; her character, whether
good or bad, cannot therefore constitute either an aggravating or mit-
igating circumstance.' '5 Under this approach, victim impact evidence
would be inadmissable unless it had some bearing on the circumstances
of the crime, for example, the defendant's personal responsibility and
moral guilt, thereby making it a foreseeable or intended consequence
of his actions.
The admissibility of victim impact evidence is also troubling because
as the Court in Booth noted, admitting victim impact evidence will
promote comparative judgments. In a footnote the majority stated, "We
are troubled by the implication that defendants whose victims were assets
to their community are more deserving of punishment than those whose
victims are perceived to be less worthy." 9 This concern was echoed in
Justice Stevens' dissent in Payne.60 In crimes for which the death penalty
may be imposed, such as murder, the harm is the death of a human
being, not the death of a "worthy" or "unworthy" victim. Surely a
defendant should not expect *a reduced sentence if he did society a
"favor" by eliminating a victim unworthy of life. Society does not
recognize such comparative judgments. The death of an individual and
the heinousness of the crime alone should be the basis for punishment.
Admitting victim impact evidence also goes against the Court's pre-
vious attempts to give a capital defendant every opportunity to avoid
the death penalty. The Supreme Court held in McCleskey v. Kemp6'
that states cannot limit the sentencer's consideration of any relevant
circumstances that could cause it to decline to impose the death penalty
in a capital case. In Zant v. Stephens,6" the Court found that a criminal
statute that provided for a mandatory death sentence was unconstitu-
tional. In its reasons for the decision, the Court found that the jury
must be able to consider mitigating circumstances that may justify a
lesser sentence.
It appears that the underlying rationale of these two cases is to give
the jury every opportunity to impose the lesser penalty of life impris-
onment. By admitting victim impact evidence, the sentencer is being
encouraged to impose the death penalty. This result is directly contra-
dictory to affording the defendant every opportunity to receive the lesser
penalty.
57. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S 496, 502, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2532 (1987) (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932 (1976)).
58. Payne v. Tennessee, III S. Ct. 2597, 2627 (1991).
59. Booth, 482 U.S. at 506 n.8, 107 S. Ct. at 2535 n.8.
60. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2631.
61. 481 U.S. 279, 305-06, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1774-75 (1987).
62. 462 U.S 862, 103 S. Ct.. 2733 (1983).
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Finally, the Payne Court ignored the basic set-up of the criminal
system when it found fairness requires victim impact evidence be ad-
missible to counteract the mitigating evidence which the defendant is
entitled to introduce.6 As the dissent pointed out, this reasoning is faulty
because it is based on the incorrect proposition that a criminal prose-
cution requires an even-handed balance between the state and the de-
fendant. 6 The system is purposely designed to protect the individual
from the disproportionately powerful hand of the state. Likewise, rules
of evidence are also weighted in the defendant's favor. 6' The state of
course can rebut directly the mitigating evidence introduced by the
defendant, and thus does not need the admission of victim impact
evidence to ensure fairness to the state.
V1. RECOMMENDATIONS SPECIFIC TO LOUISIANA
Thus far, Louisiana courts have not admitted victim impact evidence
at sentencing hearings in capital trials. The Code of Criminal Procedure
dictates in Article 905.2: "The sentencing hearing shall focus on the
circumstances of the offense and the character and propensities of the
offender. .. ."6 Further, in order for a jury of twelve to impose the
death penalty, it must find that at least one statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance exists.67 The impact on the victim's family is not among the
exclusive list of statutory aggravating circumstances warranting the im-
position of the death penalty. Louisiana should not amend the list to
allow victim impact to increase a sentence of life imprisonment without
possibility of parole to death. The statutory list of aggravating circum-
stances reflects the notion of holding a defendant responsible for the
foreseeable or intended consequences of his actions or for an individual
characteristic of .his by increasing his sentence to death.
Louisiana does have a statute which enumerates the rights of crime
victims." This statute gives the victim or the victim's family the right
to file a victim impact statement with the court. To date, Louisiana
has not applied this statute to capital sentencing hearings.
Louisiana law concerning capital sentencing hearings should not be
disturbed in light of Payne. As always, Louisiana is able to afford
greater protection to its criminal defendants than federal law mandates.
63. Payne v. Tennessee, III S. Ct. 2597, 2608 (1991).
64. Id. at 2627.
65. Id.
66. La. Code Crim. P. art. 905.2.
67. La. Code Crim. P. arts. 905.3, 905.4.
68. La. R.S. 46:1844 (Rights of Crime Victims) (West Supp. 1991).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Payne, although a technically correct decision, leaves the states broad
discretion in deciding whether to admit victim impact evidence in a
capital sentencing proceeding. As pointed out, admission of this evidence
is highly inequitable because it is irrelevant to a particular defendant's
moral responsibility and personal guilt. Even if it was relevant in a
particular case, by its nature this type of evidence is unduly prejudicial.
It encourages comparative judgments based on emotion rather than
reason. It therefore has no place in a capital sentencing hearing where
the defendant should be afforded every opportunity to convince the jury
to impose a penalty less than death.
Elizabeth Anna Meek
